

ननु यद्यात्मा मनश्चक्षुरादेरगम्यः , कथं तर्हि अस्य सिद्धिः ? घटपटादयो हि
मनश्चक्षुराद्यधीनसिद्धयो दृष्टाः । ततः आत्मनोऽपि तदधीनसिद्धिर्युक्ता । यदा तस्य तदधीना
सिद्धिर्न भवति, तदा अस्य सिद्धिरेव न स्यात् शशविषाणवत् इत्यत आह --

*nanu yadyātmā manaścakṣurāderagamyah katham tarhi asya siddhiḥ | ghaṭapaṭādayo hi
manaścakṣurādyadhīnasiddhayo dṛṣṭāḥ | tataḥ ātmano'pi tadadhīnasiddhiryuktā | yadā
tasya tadadhīnā siddhirna bhavati tadā asya siddhireva na syāt śaśaviṣāṇavat ityata āha*

Doubt: If the Self cannot be objectified by the mind, eyes, etc. how then does one arrive at its existence, because it is found that establishing the existence of a pot, fabric, etc. is dependent on the mind, eyes, etc? Therefore, it is proper to assume that establishing the existence of the Self depends on them also. If establishing its [the Self] existence were not dependent on them [mind, sense, etc.] then there would be no proof of its existence at all, like the horn of a rabbit. For this, he says:

य एको विभाति स्वतः शुद्धचेताः

प्रकाशस्वरूपोऽपि नानेव धीषु ।

शरावोदकस्थो यथा भानुरेकः

स नित्योपलब्धिस्वरूपोऽहमात्मा ॥ ६ ॥

*ya eko vibhāti svataḥ śuddhacetāḥ
prakāśasvarūpo'pi nāneva dhīṣu |
śarāvōdakastho yathā bhānurekaḥ
sa nityopalabdhisvarūpo'hamātmā || 6 ||*

That which is One shines of its own accord for the one whose mind is pure. Even though it is self-effulgent, it appears as though many and varied in the minds; just as the sun, which is one, appears as many and varied in bowls of water. I am that Self, whose nature is timeless consciousness. (6)

य इति स्वतःसिद्धतामाह । एकः अद्वितीयः विभाति विशेषेण प्रकाशते स्वतः स्वयमेव न परतः
शुद्धं निर्मलं चेतो मनो यस्य सः स्वतःशुद्धचेताः ; शुद्धचित्तस्य हि आत्मा स्वयमेव
स्फुरतीत्यर्थः । अत एव सत्त्वसुद्धयर्थं वेदेऽपि वेदानुवचनादयो विहिताः -- 'तमेतं
वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन' इति ।

*ya iti svataḥsiddhatāmāha | ekaḥ advitīyaḥ vibhāti viśeṣeṇa prakāśate svataḥ svayameva
na parataḥ nirmalaṁ ceto mano yasya saḥ svataḥśuddhacetāḥ śuddhacittasya hi ātmā
svayameva sphuratītyarthaḥ | ata eva sattvasuddhyarthaṁ vede'pi vedānuvacanādayo
vihitāḥ tametaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena
iti |*

[In this verse, beginning with] *yaḥ* 'the one who,' he [the author] talks about the self-evident nature [of the Self]. He who is *ekaḥ* one, non-dual [Self], *vibhāti* shines *svataḥ* by itself alone, not from the light of another; *śuddham* means pure, *cetas* means mind; for whom the mind is pure, he is called *śuddhacetāḥ*, one whose mind is pure; definitely, for the one whose mind is pure, the Self shines [becomes evident] of its own accord (*svataḥ*), thus, this how it is to be understood. For this reason alone, in the Veda also, daily recitation of the Vedas, etc. are enjoined for gaining purity of mind,—“Brahmanas desire to know this by daily recitation of the Vedas, by Vedic rituals, by acts of giving, and by the austerity of fasting ¹ (*anāśakena*)” Bṛhad. 4. 4. 22

घटपटादयश्च जडत्वात् प्रकाशान्तरापेक्षत्वाच्च न प्रकाशन्त इति युक्तम् । आत्मा तु
प्रकाशस्वरूपत्वात् प्रकाशान्तरानपेक्षः प्रकाशते सवितृवत् -- यथा सविता स्वप्रकाशः
प्रकाशान्तरं नापेक्षते अथ च प्रकाशते , तद्वदात्मापीति भावः ।

*ghaṭapaṭādayaśca jaḍatvāt prakāśāntarāpekṣatvācca na prakāśanta iti yuktam | ātmā tu
prakāśasvarūpatvāt prakāśāntarānapekṣaḥ prakāśate savitṛvat yathā savitā svaprakāśaḥ
prakāśāntaraṁ nāpekṣate atha ca prakāśate tadvadātmāpīti bhāvah |*

¹ In this context, fasting, *anāśakena*, means abstaining from the pursuit of sensory desires, not abstaining from food. If there is abstinence from eating, one only dies, there is no knowledge of the Self . 'kāmānaśanam anāśakam, na tu bhojananiṣṭtiḥ, bhojananiṣṭtau mriyata eva, na ātmavedanam.' Bṛhad. 4.4.22 Bhāṣyam

It is proper to say that a pot, piece of cloth, etc. do not reveal themselves, because they are not self-luminous (*jaḍatvāt*) and because they are dependent on another luminary [to illumine them]. But the Self, being self-luminous, without depending on another light, shines like even the sun—To explain, the sun which is self-luminous, does not need any other light to reveal itself, and yet shines; so too, the Self, thus this is the meaning.

एवमुत्पन्नात्मज्ञानो अद्वयो जीवन्मुक्तः स्वयं प्रकाशरूपोऽपि परमार्थतो नानाविधासु धीषु
उपाधिषु नानेव भाति यः, सोऽहमात्मेति संबन्धः । शरावोदकेषु उपाधिषु अवस्थितो भानुः
आदित्यः प्रकाशस्वरूपोऽपि एक एव सन् नानेव भाति, तद्वदात्मापीति भावः ।

*evamutpannātmajñāno advayo jīvanmuktaḥ svayaṁ prakāśarūpo'pi paramārthato
nānāvīdhāsu dhīṣu upādhiṣu nāneva bhāti yaḥ so'hamātmēti sambandhaḥ | śarāvodakeṣu
upādhiṣu avasthito bhānuḥ ādityaḥ prakāśasvarūpo'pi eka eva san nāneva bhāti
tadvadātmāpīti bhāvaḥ |*

The one who has gained Self-knowledge in this manner, *prakāśasvarūpo'pi* even though being self-luminous, liberated while living (*jīvanmuktaḥ*), and nondual, in reality, shines *nāneva* as though many, in the many and varied *dhīṣu* minds which are conditioning adjuncts (*upādhiṣu*), I am that Self, thus the [syntactical] connection. *Śarāvodakasthaḥ* abiding in bowls of water, which are conditioning adjuncts, *bhānuḥ*, the sun, even though self-luminous, being *ekaḥ*, one alone, shines as though many; so too, the Self. Thus, this is the meaning.

ननु कथं जीवन्मुक्तः ? देहवांस्तावत् जीवन्नित्युच्यते; तस्य जीवतोऽपि यदि देहाभावो
मुक्तिरभिप्रेयते, नासावुपपद्यते, विरोधात् । न हि जीवतो देहाभावः संभवति ।

*nanu katham jīvanmuktaḥ dehavāntāvāt jīvannityucyate tasya jīvato'pi yadi dehābhāvo
muktirabhipreyate nāsāvupapadyate virodhāt | na hi jīvato dehābhāvaḥ sambhavati |*

Doubt: How can one be liberated while living (*jīvanmuktaḥ*)? As long as one has a body he is said to be living. If liberation, which implies the absence of the body, is intended for him [the *jīvanmuktaḥ*], even while living, that is not

possible, because contradictory, for the absence of a body for one who is living is not possible.

अथ सत्यपि देहे भोगविच्छेदो मुक्तिरिति, तदपि न चतुरश्रम् । सकलभोगकारणेन्द्रियसंपत्तौ भोगविच्छेदस्य असंभावितत्वात् । मिथ्याज्ञाननिबन्धनो हि भोगः; तस्य च संयग्ज्ञानेन निवृत्तत्वात् भोगविच्छेद इति चेत्; न, बाधितस्यापि मिथ्याज्ञानस्य द्विचन्द्रादिज्ञानवत् अनुवृत्त्यभ्युपगमात् । अन्यथा देहवानेव न स्यात् । अत एव विदुषां जनकादीनां राज्यादिकं श्रूयते । श्रुतिरपि देहवतो भोगविच्छेदं प्रतिषेधति -- 'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति' इति । तस्माद्युक्ता जीवन्मुक्तिरिति ।

atha satyapi dehe bhogavicchedo muktiriti, tadapi na caturaśram | sakalabhogakāraṇendriyasampattaū bhogavicchedasya asambhāvitatvāt | mithyājñānanibandhano hi bhogaḥ; tasya ca saṁyagjñānena nivṛttatvāt bhogaviccheda iti cet; na, bādhitasyāpi mithyājñānasya dvicandrādijñānavat anuvṛttyabhyupagamāt | anyathā dehavāneva na syāt | ata eva viduṣāṁ janakādīnāṁ rājyādikaṁ śrūyate | śrutirapi dehavato bhogavicchedaṁ pratiṣedhati—'na ha vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayorapahatirasti' iti | tasmādayuktā jīvanmuktiriti |

Further, if you say that, even though the body is there, there is liberation which is the cessation of sensory experience, that also does not square well. Because there is no possibility of cessation of sensory experience when one is endowed with sense organs, which are the cause of all sensory experience. If you say that there is the cessation of sensory experience because sensory experience is caused by erroneous knowledge (*mithyājñāna*)² and because through clear knowledge there is the cessation of that [*mithyājñāna*], We say no, because of acceptance of the continuation of *mithyājñāna* even though sublated (*bādhitasyāpi*), like the cognition of two moons etc.³

² When the subject-object division is taken to be real, that is called *mithyājñāna*

³ In the wake of knowledge of the nondual reality, the appearance of the subject-object division remains; the *mithyājñāna* becomes *bādhitā*, sublated, that is, the experience remains but it is no longer taken to be real, like the person who, even though seeing two moons because of a defect in the eye, knows there is only one moon.

Otherwise, he [the *jīvanmuktaḥ*] definitely couldn't have a body. And for this very reason, the *śruti* talks of ruling a kingdom, etc, for wise men such as Janaka and others. The *śruti* also negates the cessation of sensory experience for the one who has a body -- "Indeed, as long as one has a body, there is no cessation of pleasure and pain." Therefore, liberation while living (*jīvanmuktiḥ*) is untenable.

अत्रोच्यते -- जीवतस्तावत् तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न तु मृतस्य; शमदमादेः श्रवणमननादेश्च
ज्ञानहेतोः मृतस्यासंभवात् । अत एव हि विदुषां याज्ञवल्क्यादीनां संन्यासः श्रूयते । न च
मृतस्य संन्यासः श्रूयते संभवति वा । तस्मात् जीवतस्तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इति सिद्धम् ।
आत्मज्ञानादेव मुक्तिरिति सिद्धा जीवन्मुक्तिः 'स यो ह वै तत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति'
'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

*atrocyate jīvatastāvāt tattvajñānamutpadyate na tu mṛtasya śamadamādeḥ
śravaṇamanānādeśca jñānahetoḥ mṛtasyāsambhavāt | ata eva hi viduṣāṃ
yājñavalkyādīnāṃ sannnyāsaḥ śrūyate | na ca mṛtasya sannnyāsaḥ śrūyate sambhavati vā
| tasmāt jīvatastattvajñānamutpadyata iti siddham | ātmajñānādeva muktiriti siddhā
jīvanmuktiḥ sa yo ha vai tatparamaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati brahmaividāpnoti
param ityādiśrutibhyaḥ |*

In this regard, it is said: Knowledge of truth only takes place for the living, not for the dead; because the prerequisites for knowledge--control of the mind, organs of action, etc. (*śamadamādeḥ*) and listening, reflection, etc. (*śravaṇamanānādeśca*)--are not possible for the dead. Therefore, for wise men like Yājñavalkya, renunciation (*sannnyāsa*) is mentioned by the *śruti*. And the *śruti* does not talk of renunciation for the dead, nor is that possible. Therefore, that knowledge of truth takes place only for the living is established. Because liberation is only from Self knowledge, liberation while living (*jīvanmuktiḥ*) is established, as stated in *śruti* statements such as "He who knows that supreme Brahman becomes that very Brahman." and "The knower of Brahman obtains the supreme."