

mind and senses, insentient by nature, function. I am that Self whose nature is timeless consciousness. (2)

यं नित्यबोधस्वरूपमात्मानम् आश्रित्य मनश्चक्षुरादीनि प्रवर्तन्ते, सोऽहमात्मेति सम्बन्धः । ननु कथं बोधस्य नित्यत्वम् ? बोधो हि नाम ज्ञानम् ; तच्च इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षादिना जायते समुत्पद्यते; उत्पन्नं च ज्ञानं स्वकार्येण संस्कारेण विरोधिना ज्ञानान्तरेण वा विनश्यति; अतः उत्पत्तिनाशधर्मवत्त्वात् न नित्यं भवितुमर्हति; नापि बोधस्वरूपत्वमात्मन उपपद्यते, नित्यत्वादात्मनः; अनित्यत्वाच्च बोधस्य; न हि नित्यानित्ययोरेकस्वभावत्वम्, विरोधात् इति ।

yaṁ nityabodhasvarūpamātmānam āśritya manaścakṣurādīni pravartante so'hamātmēti sambandah | nanu katham bodhasya nityatvam bodho hi nāma jñānam tacca indriyārthasannikarṣādīnā jāyate samutpadyate utpannam ca jñānam svakāryeṇa saṁskāreṇa virodhinā jñānāntareṇa vā vinaśyati atah utpattināśadharmavattoāt na nityam bhavitumarhati nāpi bodhasvarūpatvamātmana upapadyate nityatvādātmanaḥ anityatvācca bodhasya na hi nityānityayorekasvabhāvatvam virodhāt iti |

“Depending on whom--the Self whose nature is timeless consciousness (*nityabodha*)--the mind, eyes, etc. function, I am that Self” – this is the [syntactical] connection. Doubt: How can *bodha* be timeless (*nitya*)? Because the word *bodha* means *jñānam* (a cognition). [Note: the argument here concerns the use of the word ‘*bodha*’ which has different meanings. In this argument it is being defined as knowledge in the form of a cognition. If that is the meaning of the word *bodha* here, then how can it be timeless, as in the compound *nityabodha*?] And a cognition is produced by the contact of sense organs with sense objects, etc. [that is, other *pramāṇas* such as *anumāna*]; And the cognition which is produced is destroyed by an

impression which is an effect of it or by another cognition which is opposed to it. Therefore, because of having the quality of being produced and destroyed, a cognition cannot be timeless. Nor can the Self be a cognition, because the Self is timeless and a cognition is timebound. The timeless and the timebound do not have the same nature, because they are opposed to each other.

अत्रोच्यते -- बोधो हि नाम चैतन्यमभिप्रेतम् ; न च ज्ञानं चैतन्यम्, जन्यज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयत्वेन घटादिवज्जडत्वात् । ज्ञेयं हि ज्ञानम्, घटज्ञानं मे जातं पटज्ञानं मे जातमिति साक्षादनुभूयमानत्वात् । अतः तस्य अनित्यत्वेन अनात्मस्वरूपत्वेऽपि, नित्यबोधस्वरूपत्वम् आत्मन उपपद्यते ।

atrocyate bodho hi nāma caitanyamabhipretam na ca jñānaṁ caitanyam janyajñānasya jñeyatvena ghaṭādivajjadatvāt | jñeyaṁ hi jñānam ghaṭajñānaṁ me jātaṁ paṭajñānaṁ me jātamiti sāksādanubhūyamānatvāt | ataḥ tasya anityatvena anātmasvarūpatve'pi nityabodhasvarūpatvam ātmana upapadyate |

Here it is said: The word “*bodha*,” is meant to convey consciousness; and consciousness is not a cognition; because a cognition, which is produced, is an object of consciousness, and is thus insentient, like a pot, etc. A cognition is an object of consciousness because it is directly experienced by me: “I have a cognition of a pot; I have a cognition of a cloth.” Therefore, even though a cognition is not the Self because it is time-bound, the nature of the Self as timeless consciousness [*nityabodhasvarūpam*] is possible.

ननु आत्मनः चेतनत्वे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत्, जगत्प्रकाश इति ब्रूमः । जगत् प्रकाशत इति सर्वजनसिद्धम्; तत्र ज्ञानादीनां ज्ञेयत्वेन जडत्वात्, आत्मप्रकाशेनैव

जगत् प्रकाशत इति निश्चितं भवति । आत्मा च स्वपरप्रकाशवान् सवितृप्रकाशवत्
-- यथा सविता स्वयं प्रकाशमानो जगदपि प्रकाशयति, तथा आत्मापीति ।

*nanu ātmanah cetanatve kiṃ pramāṇamiti cet jagatprakāśa iti brūmah |
jagat prakāśata iti sarvajanasiddham tatra jñānādīnām jñeyatvena jaḍatvāt
ātmaprakāśenaiva jagat prakāśata iti niścitaṃ bhavati | ātmā ca
svaparaprakāśavān savitrprakāśavat yathā savitā svayaṃ prakāśamāno
jagadapi prakāśayati tathā ātmāpīti |*

Doubt: If you ask what is the means of knowledge (*pramāṇam*) for the Self being consciousness, we say: “the world being known (*jagat prakāśah*).” It is every person’s experience that “the world is known;” and because all cognitions being objects of consciousness are not conscious by nature (*jaḍatvāt*), the world shines (is known) by the light of the Self alone; thus it is established. And the Self is its own light and the light for others, like the light of the sun—just as the sun, illumining itself also lights up the world, similarly the Self, also.

अस्तु तर्हि चिद्धर्मा पुरुषः, कथमयं चित्स्वभाव इति; न, धर्मधर्मिभावस्य
अनुपपत्तेः ।

*astu tarhi ciddharmā puruṣah kathamayaṃ citsvabhāva iti na
dharmadharmibhāvasya anupapatteḥ |*

Then let consciousness be an attribute of the Self, how can it [the Self] have consciousness as its nature? No, [it cannot be an attribute], because [between the Self and consciousness] a substantive-attribute relationship is not tenable.

तथा हि -- आत्मनश्चैतन्यं भिन्नम्, अभिन्नं वा, भिन्नाभिन्नं वा । तत्र न तावद्भिन्नं;
भिन्नं चेत् घटवदात्मधर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

*tathā hi ātmanaścaitanyam bhinnam abhinnam vā bhinnābhinnam
vā| tatra na tāvadbhinnam bhinnam cet
ghaṭavadātmadharmatvānupapatteḥ |*

To explain--Is consciousness [an attribute which is] separate from the Self, or non-separate from the Self, or both separate and non-separate? There [of these three alternatives], it cannot be separate [from the Self]; because if separate [from the Self] like a pot, [consciousness] being an attribute of the Self is untenable.

ननु घटः असंबन्धात् आत्मधर्मो न भवति, चैतन्यं तु आत्मसंबन्धीति
युक्तमात्मधर्मत्वम् इत्यपि न, संबन्धानुपपत्तेः ।

*nanu ghaṭaḥ asambandhāt ātmadharmo na bhavati caitanyam tu
ātmāsambandhīti yuktamātmadharmatvam ityapi na
sambandhānupapatteḥ|*

Doubt: A pot cannot be an attribute of the Self, because there is no connection [between a pot and the Self]. But consciousness does have a connection with the Self; therefore, being an attribute of the Self is proper [even though it is separate]. Here also, we say no, because a connection [between the Self and consciousness] is unacceptable.

Note: see Chatterjee and Datta, page 238 for definition of *samavāya* and *saṁyoga*: There are two main relations recognized in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. These are *saṁyoga* or *conjunction* and *samavāya* or *inherence*. Conjunction is a temporary or non-eternal relation between two things which can, and usually do, exist in separation from each other. Two balls moving from opposite directions meet at a certain place. The relation which holds between them when they meet is one of conjunction. It is a temporary contact between two substances which may again be separated and yet exist. (yutasiddha). So long as the conjunction is, it exists as a quality of the terms related by it. But it does not affect the existence of the those terms. It makes no difference to the existence of the balls whether they are conjoined to each other or not. Thus the conjunction is an external relation which exists as an accidental quality of two substances related by it.

As distinguished from conjunction, *samavāya* is a permanent or eternal relation between two entities, of which one inheres in the other. The whole is in its parts, a quality or an action is in a substance, or the universal is in the individuals, and particularity is in some simple eternal substance. Thus, we say that the cloth as a whole is in the threads, the colour red as a quality is in

the rose, motion as an action belongs to the moving ball, manhood as a universal is in individual men, and the peculiarity or the distinctive character of one mind or soul is in that mind or soul..... *samavāya* is thus an eternal relation between any two entities, one of which cannot exist without the other.

संबन्धो हि तावत् संयोगो वा समवायो वा स्यात्, संबन्धान्तरस्य अत्र
असंभवात् । न तावत्संयोगः, तस्य द्रव्यमात्रधर्मत्वात्, अद्रव्यत्वाच्चैतन्यस्य ।
नापि समवायः, अनवस्थापातात् । समवायो हि संबद्धः समवायिनौ संबध्नाति,
असंबद्धो वा ? न तावदसंबद्धः, घटादिवदकिञ्चित्करत्वात् ।

*sambandho hi tāvat saṁyogo vā samavāyo vā syāt sambandhāntarasya atra
asambhavāt | na tāvatsaṁyogaḥ tasya dravyamātradharmatvāt
adravyatvāccaitanyasya | nāpi samavāyaḥ anavasthāpātāt | samavāyo hi
sambaddhaḥ samavāyinau sambadhnāti asambaddho vā na
tāvadasambaddhaḥ ghaṭādivadakiñcitkaratvāt |*

Because the connection (*sambandha*) can only be one of association (*saṁyoga*) [a temporary contact between two things] or an inseparable relation (*samavāya*), because of the impossibility of another type of connection here. It cannot be an association (*saṁyoga*), because an association (*saṁyoga*) can only occur between objects and consciousness is not an object. Nor can the connection be an inseparable relation (*samavāya*) because that would lead to infinite regress (*anavasthā*). Does the inseparable relation, being connected, connect two things which have an inseparable relation or is it unconnected? It certainly can't be unconnected like a pot because that wouldn't be productive of anything.

संबद्धश्चेत्, संयोगादेरभावेन समवायस्यापि समवायान्तरमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । एवं
परंपरापेक्षायाम् अनवस्थापात इति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।