

जगत् प्रकाशत इति निश्चितं भवति । आत्मा च स्वपरप्रकाशवान् सवितृप्रकाशवत्  
-- यथा सविता स्वयं प्रकाशमानो जगदपि प्रकाशयति, तथा आत्मापीति ।

*nanu ātmanah cetanatve kiṃ pramāṇamiti cet jagatprakāśa iti brūmah |  
jagat prakāśata iti sarvajanasiddham tatra jñānādīnām jñeyatvena jaḍatvāt  
ātmaprakāśenaiva jagat prakāśata iti niścitaṃ bhavati | ātmā ca  
svaparaprakāśavān savitrprakāśavat yathā savitā svayaṃ prakāśamāno  
jagadapi prakāśayati tathā ātmāpīti |*

Doubt: If you ask what is the means of knowledge (*pramāṇam*) for the Self being consciousness, we say: “the world being known (*jagat prakāśah*).” It is every person’s experience that “the world is known;” and because all cognitions being objects of consciousness are not conscious by nature (*jaḍatvāt*), the world shines (is known) by the light of the Self alone; thus it is established. And the Self is its own light and the light for others, like the light of the sun—just as the sun, illumining itself also lights up the world, similarly the Self, also.

अस्तु तर्हि चिद्धर्मा पुरुषः, कथमयं चित्स्वभाव इति; न, धर्मधर्मिभावस्य  
अनुपपत्तेः ।

*astu tarhi ciddharmā puruṣah kathamayaṃ citśvabhāva iti na  
dharmadharmibhāvasya anupapatteḥ |*

Then let consciousness be an attribute of the Self, how can it [the Self] have consciousness as its nature? No, [it cannot be an attribute], because [between the Self and consciousness] a substantive-attribute relationship is not plausible.

तथा हि -- आत्मनश्चैतन्यं भिन्नम्, अभिन्नं वा, भिन्नाभिन्नं वा । तत्र न तावद्भिन्नं;  
भिन्नं चेत् घटवदात्मधर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

*tathā hi ātmanaścaitanyam bhinnam abhinnam vā bhinnābhinnam  
vā | tatra na tāvadbhinnam bhinnam cet  
ghaṭavadātmadharmatvānupapatteḥ |*

Because, if so, -- Is consciousness [an attribute which is] separate from the Self, or non-separate from the Self, or both separate and non-separate? There, [of these three alternatives] it definitely can't be separate [from the Self]; because if like a pot, it is separate, then it can't be an attribute of the Self.

ननु घटः असंबन्धात् आत्मधर्मो न भवति, चैतन्यं तु आत्मसंबन्धीति  
युक्तमात्मधर्मत्वम् इत्यपि न, संबन्धानुपपत्तेः ।

*nanu ghaṭaḥ asambandhāt ātmadharmo na bhavati caitanyam tu  
ātmāsambandhīti yuktamātmadharmatvam ityapi na  
sambandhānupapatteḥ |*

Doubt: A pot cannot be an attribute of the Self, because there is no connection [between a pot and the Self]. But, consciousness does have a connection with the Self; therefore, being an attribute of the Self is proper [even though it is separate]. To this also, we say no, because a connection [between the Self and consciousness] is not tenable.

Note: see Chatterjee and Datta, page 238 for definition of *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*: There are two main relations recognized in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. These are *saṃyoga* or *conjunction* and *samavāya* or *inherence*. Conjunction is a temporary or non-eternal relation between two things which can, and usually do, exist in separation from each other. Two balls moving from opposite directions meet at a certain place. The relation which holds between them when they meet is one of conjunction. It is a temporary contact between two substances which may again be separated and yet exist. (*yutasiddha*). So long as the conjunction is, it exists as a quality of the terms related by it. But it does not affect the existence of the those terms. It makes no difference to the existence of the balls whether they are conjoined to each other or not. Thus the conjunction is an external relation which exists as an accidental quality of two substances related by it.

As distinguished from conjunction, *samavāya* is a permanent or eternal relation between two entities, of which one inheres in the other. The whole is in its parts, a quality or an action is

in a substance, or the universal is in the individuals, and particularity is in some simple eternal substance. Thus, we say that the cloth as a whole is in the threads, the colour red as a quality is in the rose, motion as an action belongs to the moving ball, manhood as a universal is in individual men, and the peculiarity or the distinctive character of one mind or soul is in that mind or soul..... *samavāya* is thus an eternal relation between any two entities, one of which cannot exist without the other.

संबन्धो हि तावत् संयोगो वा समवायो वा स्यात्, संबन्धान्तरस्य अत्र  
असंभवात् । न तावत्संयोगः, तस्य द्रव्यमात्रधर्मत्वात्, अद्रव्यत्वाच्चैतन्यस्य ।  
नापि समवायः, अनवस्थापातात् । समवायो हि संबद्धः समवायिनौ संबध्नाति,  
असंबद्धो वा ? न तावदसंबद्धः, घटादिवदकिञ्चित्करत्वात् ।

*sambandho hi tāvat saṁyogo vā samavāyo vā syāt sambandhāntarasya atra  
asambhavāt | na tāvatsaṁyogaḥ tasya dravyamātradharmatvāt, a-dravyatva-  
cchaitanyasya | nāpi samavāyaḥ anavasthāpātāt | samavāyo hi  
sambaddhaḥ samavāyinau sambadhnāti asambaddho vā na  
tāvadasambaddhaḥ ghaṭādivadakiñcitkaratvāt |*

Because the connection (*sambandha*) can only be one of association (*saṁyoga*) [a temporary contact between two objects, like a pen held in the hand] or an inseparable relation (*samavāya*) [like a quality in a substance, or the parts of a whole], because here [in this context] another type of connection is not possible. It cannot be an association (*saṁyoga*), because an association (*saṁyoga*) can only occur between objects and consciousness is not an object. Nor can the connection be an inseparable relation (*samavāya*) because that would lead to an infinite regress (*anavasthādoṣa*). Does an inseparable relation, which is itself connected [to consciousness and the Self], connect these two things [consciousness and the Self] which have an inseparable relation [with each other] or being unconnected, does it connect them? It certainly can't be something unconnected like a pot, because that wouldn't be productive of anything.

संबद्धश्चेत्, संयोगादेरभावेन समवायस्यापि समवायान्तरमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । एवं परंपरापेक्षायाम् अनवस्थापात इति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।

*sambaddhaścet, saṁyogāderabhāvena samavāyasyāpi  
samavāyāntaramabhyupagantaavyam | evaṁ paramparāpekṣāyām  
anavasthāpāta iti yatkiñcidetat |*

If connected, because of the absence of [another type of connection such as] *saṁyoga*, etc., another *samavāya* connection for the *samavāya* would have to be accepted. When there is a successive dependence in this manner, it leads to infinite regress. So much for this brief discussion.

तस्माद्भिन्नत्वपक्षे धर्मधर्मिभावः सर्वथा नोपपद्यते । अभिन्नत्वपक्षे तु बोधस्य आत्मरूपत्वेन सुतरां धर्मधर्मिभावो नास्त्येव । न हि तस्य तदेव धर्मो भवति; न हि सुक्लं शुक्लस्य धर्मो भवीति ।

*tasmādbhinnatvapakṣe dharmadharmibhāvaḥ sarvathā nopapadyate |  
abhinnatvapakṣe tu bodhasya ātmarūpatevena sutarāṁ dharmadharmibhāvo  
nāstyeva | na hi tasya tadeva dharmo bhavati na hi suklarṁ śuklasya dharmo  
bhavīti |*

Therefore, if the position is taken that [the Self and consciousness] are separate (*bhinnatvapakṣe*), a relationship between substantative and attribute is in no way possible. Whereas, if the position is taken that [the Self and consciousness] are not separate (*abhinnatvapakṣe*), even more so here, there can't be a substantive-attribute relationship, because of consciousness being the nature of the Self. An attribute cannot be an attribute of itself: white cannot an attribute of white.

तस्मात् भिन्नाभिन्नत्वपक्ष एव अवशिष्यते । स च विरोधान्न युज्यते -- न  
ह्येकमेवैकस्मात् भिन्नमभिन्नं च भवितुमर्हति, विरोधात् । अथोच्यते --  
प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् भेदाभेदौ अविरुद्धौ । तथाहि गौरियमिति पिण्डाव्यतिरेकेण गोत्वं  
प्रतीयते; तदेव पिण्डान्तरे प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् भेदेनावगम्यते; अतः प्रत्यक्षेणैव  
भेदाभेदयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् अविरोध इति -- नैतत्साधु मन्यामहे, प्रत्यक्षस्य  
अन्यथासिद्धत्वात् --

*tasmāt bhinnābhinnatvapakṣa eva avaśiṣyate | sa ca virodānna yujyate-- na  
hyekamevaikasmāt bhinnamabhinnam ca bhavitumarhat, virodhat |  
athocyate-- pratyakṣasiddhatvāt bhedābhedau aviruddhau | tathāhi  
gauriyamiti piṇḍāvyatirekeṇa gotvaṁ pratīyate; tadeva piṇḍāntare  
pratyabhijñāyamānatvāt bhedenāvagamyate ataḥ pratyakṣeṇaiva  
bhedābhedayoḥ pratīyamānatvāt avirodha iti--naitatsādhu manyāmahe,  
pratyakṣasya anyathāsiddhatvāt --*

Therefore, we are left with the alternative of [the Self and  
consciousness] being both separate and non-separate. And that is not  
possible because contradictory—one thing cannot be both separate  
and non-separate from itself, because contradictory. Now it is said  
[argued]—As demonstrated by perception, separate and non-  
separate are not contradictory. As for example, [in the perception]  
“This is a cow.” cowness appears as non-separate from the physical  
body [of the cow], but because that very cowness is recognized in  
another physical body [cow], it is regarded as separate. Therefore,  
there is no contradiction (*avirodha*) because of both separate and non-  
separate being directly perceived. If [this is your argument]--No, we  
do not consider this to be correct, because it can be erroneously  
established (*anyathāsiddha*) by perception —

भिन्नमपि हि वस्तु प्रत्यक्षेण अत्यन्तसंनिधानादिदोषात् अभिन्नवत्प्रतीयते -- यथा दीपज्वाला भिन्नापि कुतश्चित्कारणादभिन्नवत्प्रतिभासते, तथा अभिन्नमपि वस्तु भिन्नमिव प्रतिभासते -- यथा एकस्माच्चन्द्राद् द्वितीयश्चन्द्र इति -- अतः प्रत्यक्षस्य अन्यथासिद्धत्वात् न तेन प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणसिद्धस्य भेदाभेदविरोधस्य प्रतिक्षेपो युक्त इति ।

*bhinnamapi hi vastu pratyakṣeṇa atyantasannidhānādidoṣāt  
abhinnavatpratīyate-- yathā dīpajvālā bhinnāpi  
kutaścitkāraṇādabhinnavatpratibhāsat, tathā abhinnamapi vastu  
bhinnamiva pratibhāsat-- yathā ekasmāccandrād dvitīyaścandra iti-- ataḥ  
pratyakṣasya anyathāsiddhatvāt na tena pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇasiddhasya  
bhedābhedavirodhasya pratikṣepo yukta iti ।*

Because a thing, even though separate, is directly perceived as though non-separate due to a defect such as extremely close proximity—for instance, a flame of a lamp, even though separate, for a variety of reasons appears as though non-separate; so too [conversely], an object, even though non-separate, appears as though separate—as a second moon from one moon -- Therefore, because perception can lead to erroneous conclusions (*pratyakṣasya anyathādidhatvāt*), on the basis of perception, rejection of the contradiction of [an attribute] being both separate and non-separate [from the substantive], which is established by a valid means of knowledge, is not proper.

अथैवमुच्यते -- चैतन्यस्य द्वे रूपे स्तः ; आत्मस्वरूपता चैतन्यस्वरूपता चेति ।  
तत्र आत्मस्वरूपतया आत्मनो न भिद्यते; भिद्यते च चैतन्यस्वरूपतया ।